29 Sep Dwa Bratanki: Cooperation in the Field of Security Policy
CEID organised a conference with four panel discussions on Polish-Hungarian relations in partnership with the Corvinus Society for Foreign Affairs and Culture (CSFAC) and the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) supported by the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Hungary and the Polish Institute in Budapest. The main purpose of the conference was to enhance foreign policy cooperation between Poland and Hungary through emphasizing the main points of convergence and common interests, while also identifying the roots of the existing differences in order to find potential strategies for their settlement.
Speakers of the second panel discussion were:
István Balogh, Head of Department, Department of Security Policy and Non-proliferation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Dominik P. Jankowski, Chief Specialist for Crisis Management, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland
Marcin Terlikowski, Head, European Security and Defence Economics, PISM
Tamás Csiki, Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic and Defense Studies
The discussion was moderated by Dániel Bartha, Executive Director of CEID
The following text is a summary of the discussion.
Cooperation in the field of security policy, defense cooperation in the V4
The South-East divide and its true significance
The disunity of NATO on the Southern and Eastern security threats is an often cited weakness of the Alliance. There is no doubt that the simultaneous events of Russia’s escalating proxy war on the East and growing instability on the South coupled with a rapidly deepening refugee crisis put an enormous amount of pressure on NATO decision-making. It also seems to be evident that creating fractures within the European security architecture is at the heart of President Putin’s long-term strategy aimed at undermining Western cooperation frameworks. Nonetheless, the results of the Wales summit prove that despite their discrepancies NATO member states are still capable of reaching consensus. The length of the Wales communiqué is a proper measurer of the efforts put into conciliating all diverging viewpoints in order to create a unified posture at the end. The Readiness Action Plan is designed to respond to threats coming from both directions, the South and the East. Accordingly, member states are expected to engage in the strengthening of both the Southern and the Eastern Flank of Europe. Of course, while solidarity must remain the backbone of the Alliance, national interests cannot be completely disregarded. Having country specific priorities, though, does not legitimize unbalanced contributions to certain causes. In case of Poland, one might reasonably assume that the horrific vision of an expansionist and aggressive Russia outweighs all other security concerns. While territorial security and reassurance of the Eastern Flank undeniable have primacy in the Polish foreign policy strategy, the country’s contribution to the fight against ISIS demonstrates its willingness to partake in missions related to the Southern dimension as well. The only reason why Poland has not yet granted operational support to the international coalition is because it has not been requested to do so. As to the upcoming Warsaw summit, the full implementation of the RAP must be the primary objective, while other pressing issues, such as creating a long-term vision on the adaptation of NATO and offering something substantial instead of partnership to Ukraine, should not be dismissed either.
Beyond the Battle Group
To a certain extent, the true significance of the V4 Battle Group is rather symbolic. It serves as a tangible proof of political will behind enhancing defense and security cooperation of the Visegrad countries. In this respect, the mere existence of such a project carries great value by itself. Still, The V4BG neither creates a functioning model nor is there any clear scenario for the sustainability of any of its elements in the future. However, the potential lying in broadly speaking defense cooperation goes well beyond the Battle Group. For instance, common training and exercises gained new momentum in face of the crisis in Ukraine, prompting such high-visibility exercises as the Trident Juncture. In order to better exploit the possibilities of cooperation in this field, educating political elites is essential. In Poland, every MP receives a defense policy training regardless of his/her field of expertise. The introduction of the same practice in every V4 country under joint coordination would be highly beneficial. The institution of standing experts for military alliances – such as in case of the British-US or British-French alliances – has proven to be a greatly constructive structure, the application of which within the Visegrad context might just as well ensure a long-term framework for defense cooperation.
A realistic approach towards defense cooperation
The underlying reason for the deficiency of common procurements in the Visegrad region derives from the inherently controversial nature of governance in the field of security policy. It is a widespread phenomenon – not a unique characteristic of V4 countries – that Ministries of Foreign Affairs find it hard to get along with Ministries of Defense and vice versa. Since defense is an extremely sensitive issue, decisions on the management of armed forces must be taken very carefully and under the control of military personnel. On the other hand, everything related to the military strategy of a country has repercussions in its foreign relations, which explains why foreign policy and security policy experts need to be involved in the decision-making procedure as well. Due to the explicit differences in institutional structures, decision-making mechanisms and general attitudes between these two entities, the expectation of flawless and effective cooperation is rather utopian. Given the many internal hindrances, the abundance and complexity of difficulties when it comes to regional cooperation seems logical. The wide range of legal obstacles, the handling of classified information and diverging practices are only some of the complications. Hence, expectations and achievable goals must be realigned to reality, focusing on those areas where there is great potential for further developments instead of insisting on the successful implementation of infeasible projects. What might be a viable solution is the adoption of “a la carte” cooperation, allowing each member country to individually choose in which fields and with whom it intends to work together. In addition to this, the creation of a common pull of money dedicated to support R&D activities in the defense industry would foster the aptitude for such initiatives through market mechanisms.
Different but complimentary
Although the defense sectors of Poland and Hungary have many similarities such as institutional practices due to shared historic experience, we have to be aware of the existence of substantial disparities as well. Their different geopolitical location together with the divergence in available resources considerably affects their strategic thinking. As opposed to Hungary, Poland has a defense industry on its own. On top of that, Poland is the only Visegrad country in the position to look beyond its region in search of alternative alliances. Taking all these differences into consideration, it is safe to establish that their relationship is rather unbalanced, which constitutes the major obstacle for initiating common projects. Fortunately, bilateral cooperation in the framework of multinational forums is not equally halted by such divergence, but fruitful and constructive. Perhaps, Polish-Hungarian relations should not be driven by the wish to become more similar, but by the eagerness to complement each other in the most important security policy forums.
