28 Dec European Café: Hungary’s Preparation for the Presidency of the Council of the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities

The following study was prepared by CEID experts based on the European Café event held on December 11, 2023. The guest of the discussion was Csaba Zalai, State Secretary of the Ministry of European Affairs. The summary and recommendations were compiled based on the discussion and the statements of the participants but should in no way be considered as the official position of the guests. The European Café series is made possible with the support of Erste Stiftung.

Every EU presidency is shaped by the international environment, and this will be especially true for the Hungarian presidency starting on July 1, as discussed at the closed-door professional meeting of the European Café, where the guest was Csaba Zalai, the outgoing State Secretary of the Ministry of European Affairs.

The outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war, the upcoming U.S. presidential election, and the European Parliament and national elections (especially in Austria) create significant uncertainty. Added to this are the energy transition and the economic crisis felt across Europe, all of which the presidency must respond to in some form.

Internal and Institutional Challenges

In addition to external uncertainties, internal institutional transformations will further complicate the Hungarian presidency. It will take place after the European Parliament elections, coinciding with the election of the next European Commission. Ursula von der Leyen’s re-election seems likely, despite the Hungarian government’s well-known opposition to her. The Hungarian government is expected to support an alternative candidate, but if von der Leyen runs again—something she has not yet officially announced—her re-election is almost certain. It is also possible that the Hungarian government will have to work with both the outgoing and incoming Commission, and if von der Leyen remains President of the European Commission, tensions between the Hungarian EU presidency and the Commission could be expected.

Challenges in Governance and Logistics

On a professional level, the Hungarian bureaucracy will strive to perform well. Although the government suggests it can simply dust off old files from its previous 2011 presidency, the reality is much more complex. Very few experiences from 2011 can be applied, and only about one-quarter to one-third of the current staff has experience from the previous presidency.

Handling Council meetings will be demanding, with 100 committees and 157 working groups meeting weekly or biweekly, all of which Hungary will need to chair. Additionally, Hungary will represent the EU at major international conferences, including COP29 in Azerbaijan and the Biodiversity Summit.

The Hungarian public administration is expected to be under immense pressure, as it already struggles with labor shortages even without the presidency. While the Permanent Representation in Brussels has enough specialists, significant resource reallocation will be necessary within Hungarian ministries.

Agenda and Priorities

Due to the nature of the EU’s operation, second-half presidencies are usually shorter, lasting only about 2.5–3 months, which limits ambitions. The Hungarian agenda will partly depend on what the Belgian presidency fails to complete. The Hungarian government will officially publish its presidency priorities in May, but the main themes are already known:

1. Strengthening economic competitiveness

   • Europe’s competitiveness has declined since the Lisbon Strategy (2000).

   • The Commission is awaiting plans from Enrico Letta (internal market future) and Mario Draghi (competitiveness improvement), expected in June.

   • The Hungarian presidency will have to respond in some form.

2. Labor shortages and demography

   • Europe could see a 5–10% workforce decline over the next decade.

   • The Hungarian approach emphasizes technological development and demography as solutions.

   • The government argues that demographics affect all countries, influencing:

     • Declining birth rates

     • Aging populations

     • Depopulation of certain areas

     • Strains on social security

   • The goal is to avoid ideological disputes by framing it as a universal issue.

3. EU enlargement

   • If the EU wants to maintain influence in the Western Balkans, enlargement funds must be allocated in the 2028–2035 budget.

   • This is primarily a task for the 2025 presidencies, but Hungary wants to ensure the region is not sidelined.

   • The Hungarian government does not want the EU to remain its “eastern outpost” and also wants to prevent Ukraine from jumping ahead in the accession process, arguing that double standards should not apply between Ukraine and the Western Balkans.

   • A possible gradual integration approach is being considered, where the region could be involved in areas like:

     • Climate policy

     • Migration management

     • Access to EU funds

Recommendations

• The success of the presidency will largely depend on the Hungarian government’s reputation. It would be advisable to tone down anti-Brussels rhetoric for this year.

• Retaining experienced experts after the presidency is crucial for Hungary’s long-term EU policy. The government should develop a strategy to keep these specialists.

• A major right-wing surge in the European Parliament elections is uncertain. Hungary should work towards joining the ECR to avoid remaining isolated and resist the temptation of the ID group, which is already courting Fidesz.

• Criticizing the EU should be strategic. Competitiveness is a real issue, but Hungary itself has underperformed:

  • IMD Competitiveness Report ranks Hungary 46th out of 64 (down 7 places since 2022), while the Czech Republic is 19th.

  • In digital competitiveness, Hungary ranks 47th.

• The EU presidency is a chance for Hungary to prove that it is genuinely committed to the EU’s success and capable of constructive cooperation—a last opportunity to restore its damaged reputation.

• Regarding enlargement, Hungary should stop pushing for Serbia’s accession and instead focus on realistic solutions. The accession of Montenegro or North Macedonia would be far less controversial and set a positive precedent for future enlargement.